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Abstract
Forty years of low-intensity internal armed conflict makes Colombia home to over 3 million
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the world’s largest population. The effect of violence on
a child’s education is of particular concern because of the critical role that education plays in
increasing human capital and productivity. This paper explores the education accumulation and
enrollment gaps created by being directly affected by conflict. First, we show that children living
in high-conflict municipalities have only small gaps in education accumulation and enrollment
in comparison to those living in low-conflict municipalities. These gaps grow when we compare
those directly affected by conflict (IDPs) to non-migrants. Even when we compare IDPs to other
migrant groups, the education gap persists. Our results suggest significant education accumulation
and enrollment gaps for children of IDPs that widen to over half a year in secondary school. The
difference that emerges we focus on direct exposure to conflict versus simply living in a high-
conflict municipality suggests a need to distinguish between general and targeted violence when
estimating the impact of conflict on education outcomes.
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1 Introduction
For over forty years, Colombia has been troubled by armed conflict. The primary aggressor, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), emerged as a revolutionary Marxist organization
in the 1960s in response to political exclusion of the rural poor. Later, right-wing paramilitaries
formed formed to counter the leftist FARC. Both irregular armed groups have since come to rely on
narcotrafficking and other illegal activities to finance the conflict and are criticized internationally
for human rights abuses targeting civilians.1 Although peace talks have occurred under nearly every
president, attempts at negotiation and disarmament have failed to bring lasting peace.
One result of this disruptive, long-term conflict is the mass displacement of Colombians. Cur-
rently, Colombia has the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) of any country in the world, with
3.6 million registered since 1997 according to the UNHCR 2010 Global Trends report. Empirical
evidence suggests that IDPs move as a direct result of fighting, land confiscation, massacre, fear of
forced recruitment into the armed groups, death threats, death of family or community members,
and other fear-inducing elements of conflict (Kirchoff and Ibáñez 2002). After moving, IDPs face
obstacles to social and economic integration in receptor locations, including psychological trauma,
reduced social capital, family fragmentation, difficulty finding employment, and loss of assets. For
example, Kirchhoff and Ibáñez (2002) show that 83% of landowners in their study were forced to
abandon their land without compensation. The particular challenges of forced displacement suggest
that IDPs are a highly vulnerable group requiring special attention in order to successfully integrate
into the larger community.
Although efforts have been made to protect IDPs and to assist them in resettlement, there is
anecdotal evidence that IDPs are still vulnerable many years after migration.2 One possible expla-
nation for this is that government aid to IDPs is restricted to the first three months of displacement.
Meanwhile, longer-term income generation programs have had only limited success in helping IDP
families return to their previous economic status (Ibáñez and Moya 2009).
Education significantly improves an individual’s chances to increase welfare and escape poverty
and plays a critical role in socioeconomic development. Our goal in this paper is to show how being
directly affected by conflict impacts education outcomes of school aged children in Colombia. To do
so, we answer four related questions.
First, are there education accumulation and enrollment gaps for children living in high-conflict
1It should be noted that the Colombian Army has also been criticized for ’false positive’ killings of civilians.
2The 1997 Law 387 dictates government policy concerning assistance to IDPs and establishes the Network of Social
Solidarity (RSS) as the coordinating entity for the strategic plan for the management of internal forced displacement.
However, government programs reach only a small portion of the registered IDP population, and UN agencies and
other humanitarian organizations play an important role in assisting the displaced.
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municipalities compared to those living in low-conflict municipalities? Second, are there education
accumulation and enrollment gaps for IDP children compared to non-migrants? Third, does living
in a high-conflict municipality create a similar education gap as being directly affected by conflict?
Finally, how do recent IDPs compare to other migrants in terms of education accumulation and
enrollment?
We make use of the Colombia 2005 Census data and the Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affair’s Humanitarian Situation Risk Index in this paper. To answer questions pertaining to
education accumulation, we use linear regression models and fixed effect models, and for questions
related to enrollment, we estimate probit models and compute marginal effects.
To answer the first question, whether living in a high-conflict municipality creates an education
gap, we use a dummy variable, setting as one those who live in high-conflict regions. We identify
individuals who fall into this category as those living in municipalities with conflict greater than
the mean. Controlling for factors that predict school accumulation and enrollment, and separating
children 6-11 years old from those 12-17 years old, we estimate the gap between individuals in
high-conflict municipalities and those living in all other municipalities. We find a slight gap in
accumulation of about 0.04 years and a gap in probability of enrollment of about 1% across both
age groups. However, if we cluster at the municipality level, most of these estimated impacts become
insignificant.
Second, we ask if an education gap exists between IDP and non-migrant children. We first
divide the sample of subgroups consisting of several types of migrants linked with their reason for
moving, and a base group of non-migrants. We focus on recent IDPs because we have no way to
identify IDPs who migrated more than five years ago.3 Using both the education accumulation and
enrollment models, and controlling for important factors that predict school-related outcomes, we
find a large and statistically significant education gap. IDP children ages 6-11 have about 0.2 years
less schooling than non-migrants, holding all else equal, while children ages 11-17 have an even larger
gap of about 0.5 years. With respect to enrollment, we find that IDP children ages 6-11 and 12-17
are 1.6% and 6.3% less likely to be enrolled in school than non-migrants, respectively.
To compare the education gaps created by living in a high-conflict municipality and by being
displaced by conflict, we restrict our sample to only those living in high-conflict municipalities.
Assuming that IDPs found in these regions are not a select group and that living in a conflict region
creates similar effects as being directly affected by conflict, there should be no accumulation or
enrollment gap between IDP children and all other children living in a high-conflict municipality.
3From now on, we will refer to recent IDPs simply as IDPs. We also refer to those who are directly affected by
conflict as IDPs.
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We estimate the education accumulation and enrollment models on this sub-sample and find that
a gap still exists and in fact grows. Specifically, we find that for IDP children ages 6-11 and 12-17,
the education accumulation gaps range from 0.22-0.32and 0.56-0.61fewer years of schooling than
non-migrant children, depending on the level of conflict to which the sample is restricted. With
respect to enrollment, evidence is mixed. For the 6-11 years age cohort, there does not appear to
be an enrollment gap. However, at the secondary level, children of IDPs in high-conflict regions
are approximately 11%less likely than non-migrants to be enrolled in school. These estimated
education gaps in high-conflict municipalities largely mirror the gaps we see when considering all
municipalities, particularly with regard to education accumulation, where we see magnitude of the
gap grow in higher-conflict municipalities.
The possible argument that non-migrants are not a good comparison group for IDPs leads to
our last question. To compare IDPs with other migrant groups in terms of education, we estimate
the accumulation and enrollment models, limiting the sample to only migrants.4 We restrict our
sample first to recent migrants because we can only detect recent IDPs in our data. However, as a
robustness check, we also expand the sample to anyone who has migrated from their place of birth.
We find that the accumulation and enrollment gaps persist and are only slightly smaller than when
we compare IDPs to non-migrants. For children ages 6-11, there is less evidence of an education
gap when we restrict the sample to recent migrants. The accumulation gap for children ages 12-17
shrinks from 0.51 years when IDPs are compared to non-migrants to 0.34years in comparison to
other migrants.
We conduct robustness checks on our main results using a fixed effect model and matching
estimators, and our inferences are still the same. The findings from our analysis suggest that
all other things being equal, though living in a high-conflict area may affect a child’s education
accumulation and enrollment, the impact is far less than being directly affected by conflict. In
addition, we find that these effects are larger at the secondary level.
This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the direct impact of conflict on education
accumulation and enrollment in Colombia. While past literature looks at the impact of conflict on
education outcomes, it generally investigates differences before and after a short, high-intensity civil
war or focuses on the impact of living in a high-conflict area. In cases of short, intense fighting, this
approach may be appropriate, but we find that in the face of the low-intensity, protracted conflict
in Colombia, a different approach is needed. Looking at individuals who have been directly affected
4The literature shows that migrants are a select group who on average tend to fall behind in education accumulation
and enrollment. However, IDPs cannot be considered a select group of voluntary migrants because their migration is
linked to exogenous events.
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by conflict provides greater insight on the impact of conflict on education outcomes. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to focus on estimating the education accumulation and enrollment
gaps for children displaced by conflict in Colombia.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section two, we review the literature on conflict
and education and also highlight studies of IDPs in Colombia. Section three is a summary of our
data sets. In section four, we provide a descriptive analysis of the data. Section five shows our
empirical model, and section six provides a detailed summary of our finding and robustness checks.
We conclude in section seven.
2 Literature Review
Education outcomes and the factors that affect these outcomes are considered extensively in the
literature. Specifically for Colombia, one factor considered is the opportunity to attend private
school through a voucher program. Angrist et al (2002) examine the short term effects of the use of
vouchers on students who applied for the vouchers in Bogotá in 1995. The longer term effects of this
program are also considered by Angrist et al (2006). They find that the voucher program increased
secondary school completion rates by 15-20%. Returns to education in Colombia have also been
estimated by several authors5
Factors that affect school attainment and enrollment have been analyzed both within and outside
Colombia. Migration, income shocks, loss of life, and institutional quality are examples of factors
examined in the literature.6 Another factor that affects attainment and enrollment highlighted in
the more recent literature is conflict. However, the challenges of collecting accurate household level
data during armed conflict volume of studies on this topic.
In one of the few studies to assess the impact of conflict on education attainment using microe-
conomic data, Shemyakina (2011) studies the impact of the 1992-1998 civil conflict in Tajikistan on
school attainment and enrollment. Shemyakina finds that regional-level exposure to the Tajik civil
conflict had little or no effect on boys’ enrollment. However, it had a large negative effect on girls’
school enrollment. Akresh and de Walque (2008) study the effects of the 1994 Rwandan genocide on
schooling. The authors find that children who lived through the Rwandan genocide, concentrated
5See Poveda and Sossa (2006), Gaston and Tenjo (1992), Psacharopoulos and Velez (1992,1993) and Psacharopoulos
(1994).
6See McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) for the impact of economic migration on education attainment in rural Mexico,
Evans and Miguel (2007) for the effect of losing a parent and the importance of institutions, and Glewwe and Jacoby
(1994) for the impact of availability and quality of school facilities on education attainment in Ghana. Also see Jacoby
and Skoufias (1997), Duryea et al (2001), and Thomas et al (2004) for the impact of income shocks on schooling
decisions in peaceful environments.
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during a 100-day period, lost nearly a half year of schooling compared to their peers who were
not exposed. They were also 15% less likely to complete grades three and four. For Guatemala,
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) examine the impact of exposure to the 36-year civil war on educa-
tion outcomes for the rural Mayan population. Exposure is measured as a department-level variable
indicating number of human rights violations and acts of violence. In this disadvantaged group, the
authors find a strong negative impact of conflict on education accumulation. For the three periods
of the civil war identified, rural Mayan males showed a 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 year decline in education
attainment, while females showed a 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 year decline. With very low education
attainment overall, this amounts to a 23% and 30% decline in years of schooling during the third
period of the war for males and females, respectively. Taken together, the literature on Tajikistan,
Rwanda, and Guatemala suggests that exposure to conflict negatively affects education outcomes.
However, each of these studies looks at regional-level exposure to violence during a high-intensity
conflict. Compared to the conflicts in Tajikistan, Rwanda, and Guatemala, the conflict in Colombia
is much more protracted, low-intensity, and involves a greater number of irregular actors. These
actors employ strategies that directly target civilians for expulsion, recruitment, and assassination.
In this situation, we cannot assume that every individual in a high-conflict region is equally exposed
to violence.
Several authors investigate the relationship between violence and education in Colombia. Barrera
and Ibáñez (2004) develop a theoretical framework to explore the three ways in which violence can
affect education. First, violence directly reduces the utility of individuals. Second, it destroys
physical capital, creating uncertainty, deterring investment, and reducing productivity. Third, it
reduces returns to education because education is not viewed as a value-enhancing commodity.7 The
authors also show a statistically significant gap in school enrollment rates between municipalities
above and below the median national homicide rate. They find that violence has a negative impact
on school enrollment at all ages, and that this effect is particularly large for young adults. While the
paper shows the negative effects of living in a violent municipality on school enrollment, it does not
provide evidence on the impact of armed conflict on education outcomes of those directly affected by
violence–the IDPs. It also does not discriminate between generalized violence and violence occurring
as a direct result of the armed conflict. Dueñas and Sanchez (2007) go a step further by looking
specifically at the impact of armed conflict. The authors look at the impact of conflict on another
school related outcome, drop-out rates. Focusing on households in the eastern part of Colombia,
they show using a duration model that the presence of illegal armed groups increases dropout rates,
with increased effects for the poorest households. Though this paper considers the impact of the
7These channels through which armed conflict affects schooling are confirmed by Shemyakina (2011).
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presence of armed conflict in an area on an education outcome, it does not look directly at IDPs,
which we feel is important given the nature of the conflict in Colombia. Rodriguez and Sanchez
(2009) build on Dueñas and Sanchez (2007) by considering the joint decision to drop out of school
and enter the labor market. The authors suggest that conflict-related violence does not seem to
affect education investments or child labor decisions for younger children, but it does negatively
impact children over age 12. Also, the authors find that the effect of violence varies primarily with
age rather than with gender or household wealth. Although looking at the impact of regional-level
exposure to violence on education outcomes is useful, it may not reveal the full impact of conflict on
those directly affected especially when the conflict is low intensity, less random and more targeted.
Though past research does not focus on the education gap of IDPs in Colombia, the plight of the
displaced in general has been considered. First, Kirchoff and Ibáñez (2002) study the probability
of individual or household migration in Colombia and find that households that have been directly
affected by violence–either assassination or death threats–have a higher probability of migrating. Of
the IDPs interviewed, 58.2% reported that a household member received a death threat, compared
to only 9.1% of non-displaced from the high-conflict regions. The authors provide extensive descrip-
tive data on the IDP population gained from interviews in three urban centers. Results indicate
that ”security considerations are not the only determinants of the displacement decision.” Rather,
displacement may be motivated by individual characteristics, such as risk aversion, or external fac-
tors such as direct targeting by guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Ibáñez and Moya (2006, 2009)
look at the vulnerability of IDPs over time and find that because IDPs are unable to successfully
integrate into the urban economy, well-being decreases and households are forced to take drastic
measures in order to smooth consumption. Lozano-Gracia et al (2010) find that while the majority
of IDPs migrate to geographically proximate locations, individuals from municipalities in the top
10% of violence levels will move far from their municipality of origin, perhaps in hope of distancing
themselves from the conflict. Taken together, the literature on IDPs in Colombia suggests vulnera-
bility stemming from loss of assets, potential psychological effects of fear and targeting, and loss of
income, all of which we expect to influence education outcomes.
Given that the effect of conflict-induced displacement on human capital investment in children
is important but largely unexplored, this paper will investigate the enrollment and attainment gaps
between IDP children, other migrants, and non-migrants.
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3 Data
The data we use to answer our questions of interest comes from two sources: the Colombia 2005
Census and the the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. We accessed the 2005
Census via IPUMS-International,8 and the majority of the data we use comes from this source.
This data includes over two million observations, a 5% sample of the 2005 Colombian Census, which
is notable for its accuracy and coverage.
We are able to identify IDPs from this data using those who state that they migrated in the
past five years and select “violence or insecurity” as the reason for migrating. This technique of
identifying IDPs has two potential limitations. First, we are unable to identify IDPs who moved
more than five years ago. This is because though we can identify indirectly all who have migrated by
comparing birth place to current place of residence, the question that allows us to identify IDPs is
restricted to those who migrated in the last five years. This limitation implies that we are unable to
look at the long term enrollment and attainment effects of direct exposure to conflict. Second, the
responses to the question of why you migrated are mutually exclusive, so each person selects only
one motivation for migration. This could potentially be an issue if an individual migrated for more
than one reason. However, we find this restriction advantageous because it forces people to pick their
most important reason for migrating. This allows us to isolate the individuals most directly affected
by conflict. Still, about 0.32% of the sample of recent migrants do not report reason for migration,
so this group may include IDPs who felt uncomfortable reporting their reason for migrating. We
create a separate category for these observations, but given the small sample size, we do not worry
about the potential impact of these observations.9 The census data is appropriate for this analysis
not only because it has a large sample and allows us identify IDPs, but also because it has a wide
range of variables that we use as controls in our enrollment and accumulation models. The major
limitation of the data is the lack of information on income. However, the Colombian census has
many indicators for poverty and wealth which we use as proxies for income.
The source of data concerning humanitarian risk, conflict, capacity, social, and economic levels
per municipality is the Humanitarian Situation Risk Index (HSRI), calculated by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in collaboration with the Universidad Santo Tomas in
2008. The HSRI was developed with the purpose of calculating the probability that a humanitarian
situation will occur at the municipality level in Colombia. Four sub-indices of risk are calculated and
8Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
9We do not suggest that our method identifies all those who officially registered with the government or international
organizations as IDPs during our data period. However, we are confident that we capture most of those whose move
was primarily driven by direct exposure to conflict from 2000-2005.
8
used to determine the overall humanitarian risk: conflict, response capacity, social, and economic.
Sources of HSRI data are included in Appendix 1. A HSRI value and a value for each of the risk
indicators is provided for each of 1,100 Colombian municipalities. However, only 532 municipalities
or groups of municipalities are defined in the 2005 Census because in many cases small municipalities
are grouped together. We can see which municipalities are included in each grouping, but we cannot
further divide the data. In order to incorporate the HSRI and its sub-indices data into the 2005
census data, we assign to each individual the value of each index in their current municipality. In
some cases where small municipalities are grouped together in the census, we find the average HSRI
and other sub-index values for all of the municipalities in that particular grouping.
4 Descriptives
In this section we present some descriptive statistics to further motivate our discussion on the
education attainment and enrollment of IDPs.10
Table 1 presents summary statistics of basic indicators for IDPs in comparison to other migrants.
Notice that in comparison to other migrants, IDPs are older, more likely to be male, have more
children in the family, less likely to be married, less likely to be in an urban area, more likely
to be black or indigenous, less likely to be literate, less likely to be employed, and more likely
to be disabled. Compared to non-migrants, IDPs are younger and have fewer years of schooling,
and there is less of a difference with respect to being married, gender, living in an urban area,
employment, and race. This may be because other migrants represent a select group. Notice that
IDPs differ significantly in some variables that may be indicative of experiences characteristic of
those who have been directly affected by conflict. For instance, IDPs are more likely than any other
group to be disabled, and they have the lowest likelihood of owning a dwelling. With respect to
education accumulation, Table 1 shows that IDPs have a lower mean education attainment than
non-migrants and other migrants. IDPs also have more children than other groups despite having
similar probability of being married and similar mean age. This difference may suggest that families
with children are more likely to be directly affected by conflict than those without or that families
with children are more likely to migrate if directly affected by conflict. The summary in Table 1
confirms the existing literature that IDPs are vulnerable. Although the literature suggests that
migrants are a select set with exceptional drive, the findings below suggest that IDPs do not fit the
mould of other migrants on average.
10It should be noted that through out this study, “IDPs” refers to Colombians who have migrated because of conflict,
according to the 2005 census. Natural disaster migrants are treated as a separate category.
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Table 1: 2005 Census: Descriptive Statistics
Category IDPs Other Migrants Non-Migrants All
Age 27.059 26.691 29.060 28.586
Male 0.509 0.492 0.503 0.501
No. children 0.984 0.787 0.809 0.807
Married 0.370 0.401 0.354 0.363
Urban 0.523 0.702 0.553 0.581
Race: White 0.705 0.836 0.796 0.803
Race: Black 0.170 0.110 0.103 0.105
Race: indigenous 0.072 0.030 0.071 0.063
Yrs school 4.354 6.321 5.125 5.349
Literacy 0.738 0.823 0.739 0.755
Employed 0.307 0.366 0.273 0.291
Disabled 0.082 0.058 0.073 0.070
To further motivate our discussion, we present some enrollment statistics. Table 2 shows propor-
tion enrolled in school by age cohort and migration status. These summary statistics suggest that
the displaced are less likely to be enrolled in school than any other group in all school age categories.
The enrollment gap is particularly substantial over age 12. We do not infer from these summary
statistics that being displaced created these enrollment differences. It is possible that the displaced
come from municipalities with less access to quality education facilities or move to communities with
less access which may lead to lower probability of enrollment.
Table 2: 2005 Census: Proportion Enrolled in School
Age Cohort IDPs Other Migrants Non-Migrants All
6-11 0.830 0.901 0.891 0.892
12-17 0.645 0.724 0.735 0.732
18-21 0.253 0.281 0.278 0.278
22-25 0.097 0.149 0.135 0.138
In Table 3, we compare IDPs with other vulnerable groups to highlight the fact that though our
discussion is focused on IDPs, IDPs are not the only vulnerable group in terms of education. The
other vulnerable groups we isolate are those who migrated because of natural disaster, the disabled,
and the poor.11 At the level of primary education, ages 6-11, the displaced are more likely to be
11We identify the poor in Table 3 through the wall materials of their housing.
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enrolled than any of these other vulnerable groups, with 83% enrollment. The displaced, natural
disaster migrants, and the disabled have similar enrollment rates from ages 12-21. Not surprising, at
all ages, the very poor lag behind in terms of enrollment, suggesting the need to control for income
or socioeconomic level in our regression analysis.









6-11 0.830 0.814 0.792 0.779
12-17 0.645 0.630 0.632 0.589
18-21 0.253 0.233 0.236 0.162
22-25 0.097 0.114 0.114 0.065
Table 4 highlights the education attainment of the displaced, other migrants, and non-migrants.
Table 4 indicates that IDPs have much lower attainment than any of the other groups, and that
the gap grows over time. These results can also be seen graphically in Figure 1. The gap grows
significantly in the 12-17 age cohort, with the displaced achieving approximately 1.05 fewer years of
schooling than non-displaced migrants and 0.92 fewer years than non-migrants. The large difference
between this group and other migrants is likely attributable to the large proportion of other migrants
who have moved for study and are therefore reach very high education attainment.
Table 4: 2005 Census: Education Attainment
Age Cohort Displaced Other Migrants Non-Migrants All
6-11 1.948 2.188 2.317 2.287
12-17 5.484 6.535 6.408 6.419
18-21 6.868 8.692 7.992 8.132
22-25 6.732 9.064 7.992 8.253
The highlighted descriptive statistics all suggests that IDPs are vulnerable in terms of education.
Even if we focus solely on potentially vulnerable migrants (migrants who have moved because of
natural disaster, health, or displacement) as in Figure 2, we still see that IDPs end up with fewer
years of schooling. Notice that IDPs migrants appear to achieve similar years of schooling as other
vulnerable migrants until secondary school, when health migrants move ahead and the displaced fall
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Figure 1:
years less schooling than those who migrated for health reasons, and natural disaster victims falling
somewhere in between.
One of the points we make in this paper is that IDPs are not like most other migrants, particularly
compared to those who migrated for endogenous rather than exogenous factors. Figure 3 highlights
the school attainment trend for three group of voluntary migrants: those who migrated for work,
family, and study. The results are logically consistent; study migrants achieve the greatest years
of schooling, and work migrants achieve the fewest. It should be noted that again, the gap does
not emerge until secondary education. All of the non-vulnerable groups shown in Figure 2 achieve
higher median education attainment than the displaced population.
These preliminary descriptive statistics suggest that children of IDPs are vulnerable with regard
to education. In this paper, we focus on the education accumulation and enrollment impact of
direct exposure to conflict on children. Even though the above results suggest lower mean education
accumulation and enrollment for IDPs or their children, this result does not imply that conflict
is responsible for the gap. It is possible that children of IDPs have parents with lower education
or who are poorer. In this scenario, a gap in education attainment or enrollment is expected. To
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5 Empirical Strategy
As mentioned above, we focus on four main questions in this paper. First, is there an education
enrollment and accumulation gap for children of those living in municipalities with high conflict in
comparison to those living elsewhere? Second, is there an education accumulation and enrollment
gap for children of those directly affected by conflict? Third, does living in a high-conflict municipal-
ity create similar education accumulation and enrollment gaps as being directly affected by conflict?
Finally, how do IDPs compare to other migrants in education accumulation and enrollment? Our
underlining goal in answering these four questions is to provide overwhelming evidence that direct
exposure to conflict leads to an education gap.
To answer our first question, we estimate a school accumulation empirical model (equation (1))
and a school enrollment empirical model (equation (2)) for a typical individual.






icθc + εic, i = 1, ....., N (1)
We assume the the regression error εi is uncorrelated with the regressors. Here, y is years of
schooling for individual i in a particular age cohort c. We focus on two cohorts in our analysis, ages
6-11 and ages 12-17, because these age groups corresponds with Colombia’s school system - primary
and secondary school. X is a vector of variables that affect a child’s schooling. These variables
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include gender, economic status correlates, family size, mother’s years of schooling, father’s years
of schooling, number of children of mother, class of work of father, class of work of mother, and
employment status of father. F is a vector of dummy variables that are important to control for,
such as state of residence and race. R is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a child is in a
high-conflict municipality and 0 otherwise. The vector W consists of regional controls such as if an
area is urban or rural and the social capacity and level of conflict of a municipality. ε is the error
term. The inclusion of parent-related variables reduces the potential of omitted variable bias given
the importance of parents’ education as a predictor of child’s education. However, including these
variables comes at a cost because not all children in the sample have information about parents.
We drop all children who do not have information on both parents’ education from the sample we
estimate. However, later in the paper we address of whether using the restricted sample for which
parental information is available creates a biased estimate.
To answer the second part of question 1, we assume that a child being enrolled in school is
a function of a set of variables Z. In this case, our independent variable is a binary variable that
takes a 1 when a child in a particular age cohort is enrolled and 0 otherwise. We rewrite equation
(2) assuming a probit modeling strategy. The Φ in equation (3) our empirical school enrollment
model indicates that this is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal
distribution. The description of the variables is the same as in equation (1) above. Using a probit
model, we estimate equation (3) and find the marginal effects. The marginal effects represent the
impact of a unit change in each independent continuous variable on the probability of being enrolled
in school. This provides a straight forward interpretation of estimated results from the probit model.
For dummy variables like R, which is the focus of the first question, the interpretation of marginal
effects is slightly different. The marginal estimate captures the difference in the probability of being
enrolled in school for a particular group dummy relative to the baseline group. In the case of R,
the estimated marginal effect captures the probability of being enrolled in school for a certain age
cohort living in a high conflict municipality relative to those living elsewhere.
Prob(S = 1|Z) = F (Z ′β) (2)






icφc) i = 1, ....., N (3)
For the second question, our empirical strategy is to first estimate equation (4) using OLS.
Notice equation (4) is very similar to equation (1). The difference lies in the matrix M in equation
(4) replacing dummy variable R. To answer the second part of question two, we also alter our
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enrollment empirical model, equation (3), dropping R and including M in equation (5). Once again
we compute and report marginal effects for the enrollment model.








icθc + εic, i = 1, ....., N (4)
M is a vector of dummy variables that divides the population based on cause for migration in
the last five years. For these dummy variables, the base group is people who have not moved in
the last five years. We call this group non-migrants. Among the migrant cause dummies, we have
a dummy for those who migrated because of violence or insecurity. This is our identifier of IDPs
and the dummy we will focus on in answering the question of whether there is an education gap for
IDPs.








icφc) i = 1, ....., N (5)
To address the third question, we re-estimate equations (4) and (5) on the sample of those exposed
to conflict. To test the sensitivity of our result, we try different ways of defining the population
exposed to conflict. First, we consider states with a conflict index above the mean. Next, we consider
municipalities with conflict index above the mean. Lastly, we consider municipalities with very high
conflict (in the top quartile of the conflict index).
We address the last question by again altering equations (1) and (3). In contrast to the first two
questions for which we focus on both migrants and non-migrants, here we restrict our sample to
only migrants. In addition, we alter the dummy variable R. Recall that for the first question, R=1
if a person lives in a municipality with high conflict. For this question, R takes the value of 1 if a
person is an IDP and 0 if the person is a migrant for any other reason.
5.1 Potential econometric issues with estimating the impact of conflict
Given our focus on estimating the school accumulation and school enrollment gaps linked with
conflict, it is important to highlight some basic issues that could make deriving consistent estimates
of these gaps difficult. First, IDPs are migrants, and in general, analysis focused on migrants could
be plagued with issues of selectivity. Migrants are a select group of people, and usually, looking at
migrants’ outcomes or the impact of migration on certain outcomes without controlling for selection
could lead to biased estimates. However, IDPs are a unique group of migrants in that their migration
is motivated by being directly affected by conflict. We can think of IDPs as involuntary migrants
linked to exogenous forces. In contrast, migrants who moved for study, family reasons or work can
be viewed as voluntary migrants linked to endogenous factors. Kirchhoff and Ibáñez (2002) note
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that not everyone in regions of high conflict migrates. Those who do leave have usually been directly
affected in a significant way by the conflict, having lost family or property or received threats of
such. The authors, show that 58.2% of IDPs surveyed received a death threat before migrating. In
contrast, only 9.1% of those who did not migrate living in the same high conflict region that the
IDPs migrated from had received a death threat. Given the uniqueness of IDPs’ experiences and the
largely exogenous nature of being directly affected by conflict, it may be possible to look at IDPs
as a different kind of migrants that may not suffer from the selection bias plaguing other migrants.
Assuming this is true, a regression in which we control for the factors that typically predict school
attainment, the estimate of the gap in school attainment or enrollment between the IDP’s and non-
migrants can give us an approximate estimate of the impact of being directly affected by conflict.
If however, non-migrants on average look very different from IDPs, then the estimated education
accumulation or enrollment gap could be upward biased.12
Another variable that several authors have noted to be endogenous when included in an accu-
mulation or enrollment model estimation is conflict. Conflict could be correlated with individuals
being poor or living in an area with low levels of social capacity. Because both of these factors are
important for human capital investment and school enrollment, the estimated effect of conflict could
be inconsistent and over estimate the impact of conflict if we do not control for capacity or address
the potential endogeneity in the conflict variable. Although the level of conflict in a region is merely
a control rather than our major variable of interest for our second and third question, conflict in a
region is used to define the exposure to conflict dummy for our first question and is also relevant for
our last question. We try to avoid the potential bias in estimating the impact of exposure to conflict
by controlling for the capacity in a municipality and also by including several poverty correlates and
wealth indicators.13 It is also important to mention that Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) highlight
another potential channel of omitted variable bias in estimating the impact of conflict on dropout
rate.14 They suggest that although exposure to conflict affects school enrollment, pressure to drop
out of school also affects dropout rates and is correlated with conflict. Therefore, it is possible to
12We are of the opinion that we can make this assumption because we compared summary statistics for variables
like age, family size, marital status and gender for IDPs, migrants and non-migrants. We noted only slight differences
between IDPs and non-migrants but bigger differences between non-migrants and migrants. We do not compare
summary statistics for variables related to education, employment or location (urban vs rural) as we expect that
these variables will be affected by being exposed to conflict and so should differ across IDPs and non-migrants. The
only variable we note significant difference between IDPs and non-migrants which is not a possible effect of conflict is
number of children. We control for this variable in our analysis.
13More on the capacity index and what is used in its computation can be found in the Table 23of the appendix. In
the data section of the paper we describe how we impute the data on conflict and capacity into our census data for
2005.
14Enrollment, our focus in this paper, is inversely related to dropout rate.
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attribute to conflict the impact of this pressure on drop out rates or enrollment. Although we think
this kind of bias will be marginal, one way to deal with this potential bias is to use instrumental
variables. We do not explore this route because we are unable find a suitable instrument that satis-
fies exclusion restriction and including a weak instrument could create more bias in our estimated
coefficients than if an OLS estimate was derived.15 Although Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) use
lagged homicide capture rates as an instrument, we are not of the opinion that this variable satisfies
exclusion restrictions. One possible way to deal with this omitted variable which we explore in our
paper is to restrict the sample to high conflict communities. In these communities, we can assume
that the pressure to drop out should on average be the same. Hence, the estimated enrollment and
attainment gaps for IDPs in comparison to non-migrants living in these high conflict region will not
be upward biased because the missing variable has similar distribution across both groups.
We also explore a fixed effect technique to overcome this problem. Pressure to migrate and level of
conflict should be similar across individuals within a municipality. This is because as Rodriguez and
Sanchez (2009) note, pressure to migrate depends on level of conflict. Conflict, social and economic
infrastructure, and other related variables that could potentially affect enrollment and accumulation
are calculated at the municipality level and should not vary greatly across the municipality. We can
therefore include fixed effects for all municipalities in our data. Of course, this problem will not deal
with any omitted variable that may vary within the municipality if that variable is correlated with
education outcomes and varies across IDPS and other groups. Although we cannot readily think of
a variable that fits this category that we have not controlled for directly or indirectly (income), we
cannot rule out this possibility.
6 Results
6.1 Does living in a high conflict area affect education outcomes?
The first question we try to answer as a motivation for our main question is if living in a high-
conflict region leads to a gap in education. The purpose of this analysis is to compare the results
to what has been noted in the prior literature on Colombia using other datasets. Figure 3 shows
the density function for the conflict index. We designate any municipality with conflict over 0.3 as
a region with high conflict. The mean conflict index is 0.276. Using this benchmark, 34.6% of the
sample is exposed to high levels of conflict. We use this information to create a dummy variable
which we include in our school accumulation and enrollment models. Individuals with a conflict
index above 0.3 are assigned a 1 and all others are assigned a 0. Controlling for the factors that can
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Figure 3: Kernel Density for Conflict Index
affect education outcomes both on the individual and regional scale, the results in Table 5 indicate
that children who live in a high conflict region have about 0.04 fewer years of schooling than those
living elsewhere. With respect to the probability of being enrolled, we note that children living in
high conflict regions have a lower probability of being enrolled in school (0.8% and 0.9% lower at
the elementary and secondary school levels respectively).Our results are quite different from those
of Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009), who find that without conflict, the average education attainment
of children between 6-11 years of age residing in conflict areas would have been 0.4 years higher,
and for children between 12-17, 1.4 years higher. This difference in results is possible for several
reasons. First, we look at the education gap by comparing children in high-conflict regions to those
in lower-conflict municipalities, which is different from comparing children in high-conflict regions
to a scenario with no conflict at all. Second, Rodriguez and Sanchez use a duration model to look
at the effect of past exposure to conflict on the probability of dropping out of school, while we look
at differences in education between children currently living in a high-conflict region compared to
those living elsewhere. Finally, Rodriguez and Sanchez use the 2003 Colombia household survey
covering 24,090 households in 128 municipalities, while we use the 2005 census with a sample size of
2,003,186 individuals across 533 municipalities. In a marked break with past research, our results
suggest that living in a high-conflict area does not necessarily drive the education gap. In fact,
when we cluster our standard error at the municipality level (because our conflict variable is at the
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Table 5: Does living in a high conflict region affect education outcomes?
Age 6-11 Age 12-17
Accumulation Enrollment Accumulation Enrollment
Model Model Model Model
Conflict Region -0.036*** -0.008*** -0.036* -0.009**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
N 171083 171393 148447 148650
F 1794.31 858.66
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000
R2 0.661 0.472
χ2 5672.32 7443.67
P > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.196
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
municipality level), we get no significant effects in all cases apart from the probability of enrollment
for children ages 6-11 years.
It is also important to mention that our estimate could be biased because of the possible en-
dogenous nature of the dummy variable for living in a high-conflict area. If living in a high-conflict
area is correlated with an omitted variable that can affect education accumulation or enrollment,
then the estimated coefficient could be biased. Although we control for many variables that could
fit this profile with our capacity index,16 one variable that we do not control for and that Rodriguez
and Sanchez (2009) point to as potentially leading to lower schooling outcomes is pressure to join
militant groups in high-conflict regions. Hence, if we do not control for this omitted variable, we
could attribute to living in a conflict region the impact of the pressure to join militant groups.
Assuming that this is true, our estimated impact of living in a conflict region could be upward
biased, implying an even smaller gap between children living in conflict region and children who do
not. Another way to interpret these results is to think of the estimated impact as an upper limit
on the difference as long as there is no omitted variable positively correlated with the dependent
variable and exposure to conflict.17
The above results suggest living in a high-conflict municipality has only a very small effect on
16The capacity index is a measure of a municipality’s infrastructure. We also tried alternative models with more
poverty correlates like home ownership, floor type, number of rooms, and the result does not change significantly.
Given this result, for the rest of the paper we restrict ourselves to just a few poverty correlates.
17We could not think of any such variable that we did not control for, but it is still a possibility.
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education outcomes. This finding leads to our second question of how being directly affected by
conflict impacts education accumulation and enrollment. Does it have a similar effect as living
in a high-conflict municipality or do IDPs find themselves particularly disadvantaged in terms of
schooling?
As highlighted in our model specification, we estimate an OLS regression, controlling for poten-
tial heteroskedasticity and controlling for the general predictors of school accumulation. For our
enrollment model, we estimate a probit model and derive the marginal effects. In both cases, we
divide the population into subgroups: non-recent migrants and recent migrants. The recent migrant
subgroup is further divided by reason for migration by eight dummy variables: work migrants, family
migrants, study migrants, natural disaster migrants, health migrants, other migrants, non-specified
migrants, and our group of interest, IDPs. These dummies allow us to compare the different groups
of migrants to a base group of non-migrants.
6.2 Results: School Accumulation Models
The results summarized in Tables 6-9 help us answer the question of whether there are education
accumulation and enrollment gaps for IDP children in comparison to other migrant sub-groups.
Specifically, Table 6 summarizes the results from our estimation of the school accumulation models
based on equation (1), for ages 6-11, using ordinary least squares (OLS) and correcting for potential
heteroscedasticity. We highlight the other control variables included in our estimation under the
table.
In column (1), we control for age, sex, race, family size, sector (urban or rural), disability,
employment status of father, class of work of father, class of work of mother, years of school of
mother, year of school of father, number of children of mother, and department of residence. We
also include some proxies for wealth because the census data does not have information on income.
There were several potential variable that we could use as proxies. Our choice reflected variables
that we believe could do a better job of capturing variation in wealth. These variables are number of
cars, if an individual has a computer, and the type of walls of residence of an individual.18 Although
we are interested in the accumulation gap for IDPs in comparison to non-recent migrants, we also
present the marginal effects for other recent migrant groups.19 The results in column (1) do not
control for conflict in the municipality or the social capacity in the municipality. Hence, estimates
may exhibit upward bias.
18We chose these three proxy for wealth but our results for IDPs do not change significantly with alternative choice
combination of potential wealth proxies like type of floor, having a toilet, ownership of dwelling, etc.
19For the rest of the paper, we will refer to non-recent migrants as non-migrants.
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Table 6: Linear Regression Model Ages 6-11: Do migrants who move because of violence and
insecurity face an education attainment gap compared to non-migrants?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All Dept municipality municipality
municipalities municipalities municipalities conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.5
Work -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.195*** -0.199*** -0.169**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Family move -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.218*** -0.213*** -0.228***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Study -0.037 -0.037 -0.039 -0.079 -0.052 -0.085
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Violence -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.197*** -0.242*** -0.218*** -0.322***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Nat. disaster -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.184*** -0.074 -0.146
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Health -0.124** -0.124** -0.124** -0.132 -0.052 -0.095
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18)
Other -0.186*** -0.187*** -0.185*** -0.212*** -0.164*** -0.150***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Not specified -0.106 -0.105 -0.097 -0.133 -0.081 -0.073
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
Sex -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.149*** -0.164*** -0.143***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban 0.018* 0.018* 0.022** 0.017 0.023 0.039
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.051***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.024***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conflict -0.012 -0.060** -0.005 -0.015 0.074
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Capacity 0.145*** 0.167*** 0.264*** 0.209***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
N 171083 171083 171083 74212 56722 28071
F 1677.81 1657.45 1635.96 974.04 599.17 300.38
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.663 0.663 0.663 0.665 0.649 0.641
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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These result suggests that children of IDPs between ages 6-11 have approximately 0.2 fewer years
of schooling than non-migrants. When we add a control for conflict at the municipality level, we do
not notice any change in the accumulation gap between children of IDPs and non-migrants (Table
(6) column (2)). In the model captured in column (3), we also control for municipality capacity,
which is a necessary control to reduce omitted variable bias in the estimate of the direct impact of
conflict. Our dummy of interest does not differ considerably in column (3) from the two previous
models. In comparison to Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009), our results suggest a smaller education
gap. For children ages 6-11, they find that violence accounts for a 0.4 year decrease in schooling.
However, this difference is not totally unexpected. We use a different technique, looking at IDPs
directly rather than a duration analysis of municipality-level exposure to conflict. Also, because
non-migrants may also be exposed to conflict, the gap between IDPs and non-migrants could be
smaller than the gap created by exposure to conflict.
Notice that the education gap we find between IDPs and non-migrants is much larger than the
gap between those living in high-conflict regions versus low-conflict regions shown in Table 5. This
difference suggests that living in a high-conflict region may lead to slightly lower school attainment,
but this factor is not nearly as significant at the 6-11 age group as being directly affected by conflict.
Our high R2s show that our model explains between 60-65% of the variation in school accumulation
for children ages 6-11. Also recall that this estimated gap may form an upper limit to the potential
accumulation gap if pressure to drop out of school is significant.
In Table 7, we summarize the results of similar models as in Table 6 but we restrict the sample
to children ages 12-17. The trend in the estimates is the same. Although our R2 drops, it is still
relatively high. Focusing on column (3), our results suggests that children of IDPs ages 12-17 have
about half a year gap in education accumulation in comparison to non-migrants. Notice that this gap
is larger than the gap for the children of all the other migrant groups apart from those who migrated
for unspecified reasons. Again, this gap is not directly comparable to the results of Rodriguez and
Sanchez (2009), who find that exposure to armed conflict creates a 1.4 year gap for children ages
12-17.20
6.3 Results: School Enrollment Models
We move away from our education accumulation model and check to see if our enrollment model
leads to similar conclusions about the education gap. First, we estimate the probability of being
enrolled in school for children ages 6-11 (Table 8) and afterwards, we estimate our enrollment model
for children ages 12-17 (Table 9). In contrast to the accumulation model for which we present
20Our base group non-migrant have not been directly affected by conflict, but could have been exposed to conflict.
22
Table 7: Linear Regression Model Ages 12-17: Do migrants who move because of violence and
insecurity face an education attainment gap compared to non-migrants?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All Dept municipality municipality
municipalities municipalities municipalities conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.5
Work -0.453*** -0.453*** -0.454*** -0.459*** -0.468*** -0.200
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Family -0.229*** -0.230*** -0.232*** -0.263*** -0.252*** -0.206***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Study 0.063 0.064 0.065 -0.183* -0.042 0.013
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17)
Violence -0.513*** -0.513*** -0.515*** -0.445*** -0.560*** -0.610***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)
Nat. disaster -0.279* -0.279* -0.281* -0.069 -0.002 -0.024
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
Health -0.458*** -0.458*** -0.457*** -0.095 -0.350* -0.378
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.30)
Other -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.222*** -0.213*** -0.186** -0.160
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Not spec -0.713*** -0.712*** -0.722*** -0.760** -0.130 -0.407
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.31) (0.28) (0.45)
Sex -0.495*** -0.495*** -0.494*** -0.512*** -0.503*** -0.534***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Urban 0.477*** 0.478*** 0.472*** 0.565*** 0.521*** 0.526***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.108***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.077***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Conflict -0.148*** -0.067 -0.036 -0.127* 0.131
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15)
CAP -0.250*** -0.234*** -0.083 0.030
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
N 148447 148447 148447 64052 48081 23326
F 795.21 785.77 777.69 305.98 172.02
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.476 0.476 0.487
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estimates, for our enrollment model, in Tables 8 and 9 we present marginal effects. The results
in column (3), our preferred model, suggest that children of IDPs ages 6-11 are 1.6% less likely to
be enrolled in school in comparison to non-migrants. Table 8 summarizes the marginal effects for
children ages 6-11.
Table 9 shows results of the probit model estimation for IDPs ages 12-17. We see an increase in
enrollment gap compared to the younger age group, with IDP children ages 12-17 6.3% less likely
to be enrolled than children of non-migrants. This finding is in line with Rodriguez and Sanchez
(2009), who find much larger effects of exposure to conflict at the secondary level versus the primary
level. One way to put this gap into perspective is to compare it to the enrollment gaps for other
migrant groups. Because we do not control for selectivity of these migrant groups, we can think
of the estimates as an upper boundary on education enrollment gaps for the other migrant groups.
Notice that even the the enrollment gaps for children whose parents moved for work or because of
natural disaster or health are smaller than the gap for IDP children.
The results above raise the question of what are the possible channels through which direct expo-
sure to conflict leads to lower education accumulation and enrollment. IDPs lose assets and sources
of income, which may create a constraint on future income streams and expenditures, including
expenditure on children’s education. However, this cannot be the only channel at work because
those who migrate because of natural disaster are also likely to have lost assets and have constraints
on their expenditures, yet their enrollment gap is not even statistically significant. Another possible
explanation is that being directly affected by conflict leads to injury or death of family members.
This could lead to reallocation of household duties, including children dropping out of school to care
for a disabled family member or going to work. Table 1 seems to support this channel, showing
that IDPs are more likely to be disabled. Another channel beyond the scope of economics could
be the psychological impact of being directly affected by conflict. Combining this potential psycho-
logical effect with the two other highlighted channels and the disruption in education that comes
with moving for exogenous reasons, one would expect the large gap in education accumulation and
enrollment for IDP children compared to non-migrants and other migrant groups.
6.4 Results: Does living in a high-conflict municipality create a similar educa-
tion gap as being displaced by conflict?
To answer the third question, we further investigate whether lower school attainment for IDPs
is linked with being directly affected by conflict, living in a high-conflict area in the past, or a
combination of both factors. We try to answer this question in several ways, starting with the
assumption that if exposure to conflict alone (i.e. living in a high-conflict municipality) is the
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Table 8: Probit Model Ages 6-11: Do migrants who move because of violence and insecurity face an
enrollment gap compared to non-migrants?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All Dept municipality municipality
municipalities municipalities municipalities conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.5
Work -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.027** -0.031** -0.021
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Family move 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Study 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.023*** 0.020** 0.024**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Violence -0.017* -0.016* -0.016* -0.012 -0.019 -0.033*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Nat. disaster -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.013 0.001 0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Health -0.026* -0.026* -0.026* -0.041 -0.037 -0.035
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Other 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Not specified -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.019 -0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Sex -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.031***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CONF -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.038***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CAP 0.012** 0.006 0.022** 0.028**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 171393 171393 171393 74322 56835 28136
χ2 5699.98 5722.44 5709.09 2096.64 2580.28 1421.15
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.152 0.152 0.143 0.174 0.180
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 9: Probit Model Ages 12-17: Do migrants who move because of violence and insecurity face
an enrollment gap compared to non-migrants?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All Dept municipality municipality
municipalities municipalities municipalities conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.3 conflict > 0.5
Work -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.036** -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Family -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Study 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.037 0.036 0.047
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Violence -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.105*** -0.107**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Nat. disaster -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.020 -0.034 -0.039
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Health -0.028* -0.028* -0.028* -0.070** -0.029 -0.015
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Other 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Not spec -0.050 -0.050 -0.051 -0.012 0.018 -0.070
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Sex -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.047***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CONF -0.025*** -0.018** -0.022** -0.013 0.052*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
CAP -0.021** -0.033** -0.016 0.021
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
N 148650 148650 148650 64136 48171 23384
χ2 7366.80 7441.71 7444.77 3614.16 2679.77 1442.17
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.191 0.192
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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primary cause of education gaps, then those who did not migrate but live in a high-conflict area
should have similar education outcomes as IDPs in those areas. Hence, if we restrict our sample to
only those living in areas with high conflict, the estimate on the IDP dummy should be 0 or close
to 0. We explore three alternative ways of restricting the sample. Our conflict index runs from 0-1
with a mean of 0.28. In column (4) of Tables 6-9 we restrict our sample to departments with a
mean conflict of over 0.3. This analysis leads to a reduction in the sample of departments in the
analysis from 33 to 14. Focusing on Table 6 column (4), we find that children of IDPs living in
high-conflict departments have a 0.24 fewer years of schooling than children of non-migrants who
live in high-conflict departments. However, averaging over the state may be misleading. Restricting
the sample based on high-conflict municipalities is more informative. In columns (5) and (6) of
Tables 6-9, we restrict the sample to only those living in municipalities with a conflict index greater
than 0.3 and 0.5 respectively. We still find that children of IDPs living in high conflict areas have a
lower school attainment (Tables 6 and 7) and lower school enrollment (Tables 8 and 9). Specifically,
we find that IDP children ages 6-11 living in high-conflict municipalities (conflict above 0.3) have
0.22 fewer years of schooling and a 1.9% lower probability of being enrolled in school (although the
enrollment gap is not statistically significant) in comparison to non-migrants living in high conflict
regions. For children of IDPs 12-17, the gap is larger: 0.56 fewer years of schooling and a 10.5%lower
probability of being enrolled.
It is worth noting from Tables 6 and 7 that the gap in education accumulation increases when
we focus on municipalities with very intense conflict (index > 0.5). For ages 6-11, the gap increases
by 0.10 to 0.32 years, and for ages 12-17, the gap increases by 0.05 to 0.61 years. We note a further
decrease in probability of enrollment in municipalities with very intense conflict, as well (see Tables
8 and 9).
These results combined with the results in Table 5 provide evidence that though municipality-
level exposure to conflict could affect education accumulation and enrollment for children, being
directly affected by conflict impacts these outcomes more significantly. Simply accounting for
municipality-level exposure to conflict does not adequately measure the education impact of vi-
olence, particularly in the context of a low-intensity conflict as in Colombia.
6.5 Results: How do IDPs compare to other migrants?
Finally, we address the question of how IDPs compare to other other migrants in terms of education
accumulation and enrollment. The results are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. Focusing on migrants
is useful for several reasons. First, it is possible to argue that IDPs are migrants, and so comparing
them with other migrants is more appropriate. In all of the previous tables, children of most migrant
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groups have lower accumulation and enrollment than non-migrants. Hence, one could argue that the
gap between IDP children and non-migrant children could be attributed part to migrant selection.
For example, children whose parents or themselves migrated for study do not exhibit the same
education gap as other migrant groups. While the argument of selectivity has credibility for most
migrant groups, IDPs and natural disaster migrants are different because they move as a result of
exogenous factors. Although it may be safe to assume that selectivity is not an issue for IDPs and
migrants linked to natural disaster, as long as not every person affected by the exogenous shock of
conflict migrates, we cannot fully rule out issues of selectivity.
Another related argument is that even if IDPs are not a select group like other categories of
migrants, the act of migrating itself may lead to disruption in schooling and thus lower education
outcomes. The problem with this argument is that it does not hold for all groups of migrants. If there
is no selectivity issue and all migrants faced equal disruption in schooling from the act of migrating,
then ceteris paribus, we should see similar education gaps across all groups when compared to non-
migrants. This is not what we see in Tables 6-9. The education accumulation and enrollment gaps
vary greatly across groups of migrants. The suggestion that reason for migrating matters motivates
our final question. As noted in the empirical strategy section, we focus this analysis first on recent
migrants because we can only identify recent IDPs. However, we then compare recent IDPs to
anyone who has migrated over their lifetime.21 Table 10 summarizes the results for children ages
6-11, and Table 11 summarizes the results for ages 12-17.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 provide support for our earlier conclusion about the direct
impact of conflict. We find that even when we compare IDPs to other migrants, who are a select
group with lower education accumulation and enrollment on average than non-migrants, we still
notice accumulation and enrollment gaps for IDPs children ages 12-17.22 However, we find that for
children 6-11 years, the gap is present but not significant except in column (5). However, if we extend
the sample to all migrants–recent or not recent (see Tables 20 and 21 in the appendix), we notice a
small but statistically significant gap in accumulation and enrollment. In contrast, when we look at
ages 12-17 in Table 11, the education gap is larger and statistically significant. When IDPs of this
age group are compared to other migrants instead of non-migrants, the education accumulation gap
shrinks by 0.15 years to 0.34, and the enrollment gap shrinks by 2.2% to 4.1%. The results from the
analysis focused solely on migrants suggests that the education gap exhibited by IDP children is not
21We are able to identify all migrants by comparing where in individual lives now to were they were born. If these
two municipalities are different, we include this person in the sample. We then compare IDPs to all other migrants.
22This gap is not created by children of migrants who move for study and are likely to have higher education
outcomes than other migrants. To verify this, we drop these children from our analysis. The estimated gap is not
statistically different with or without them.
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Table 10: Are IDPs different? Ages 6-11
Education Accumulation Model School Enrollment Model
All Migrants All obs All Migrants All
Migrants Conf > 0.3 with Conf > 0.3 Migrants Conf > 0.3 with Conf > 0.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IDP -0.042 -0.067 -0.105** -0.010 -0.022** -0.008
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sex -0.101*** -0.131*** -0.166*** -0.010*** -0.012** -0.010***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Conflict 0.011 0.007 -0.023 -0.009 -0.019 -0.032***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capacity 0.044 0.138 0.286*** 0.002 0.000 0.022**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Urban 0.044** 0.075** 0.009 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Mom Yrs of sch. 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad Yrs of sch. 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0
N 34457 11410 57815 34459 11428 57893
F 453.48 170.13 -
P > (F ) 0.000 0.000 -
R2 0.700 0.684 0.647
χ2 1299.79 553.27 2541.03
P > (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000
PseudoR2 0.157 0.144 0.173
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In column (3) and (6) we are comparing all IDPs with both migrants and non-migrants living in a region
with high conflict.
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a gap linked with simply being a migrant because this gap persists when the sample is restricted to
only migrants. However, because the magnitude of the gap decreases, there may be some negative
selection bias across migrant groups with respect to education.
To address any potential selectivity bias that may arise in Table 6-9 columns (4)-(6) when we
compare IDPs to non-migrants living in high conflict areas, we also restrict our migrants to those
living in high-conflict areas and compare them to IDPs. Because everyone in the sample migrated
to a high-conflict region, the selectivity argument cannot be made. The results in Tables 10 and
11 columns (2) and (5) suggest that for children ages 6-11, there is no difference in education
accumulation between those whose who are directly affected by conflict and those who are exposed
to conflict, but IDPs have a 2.2% lower probability of being enrolled in school. When we consider
children 12-17, the results are more consistent across both the accumulation and enrollment models.
We find that IDP children have about 0.4 fewer years of schooling and are 8.8% less likely to be
enrolled in school. This large gap could suggest one of two things. First, living in a conflict region
is only marginally important for education accumulation and enrollment, as noted in Table 5 and
confirmed here. What is important is being directly affected by conflict especially in the older age
group. Second, given that children of migrants living in high-conflict areas still have better education
outcomes than IDPs, the channel that leads to lower school accumulation and enrollment in IDPs
cannot be explained solely by migration or disruption in schools because of living in a conflict area.
Rather, loss of income of parents, lower probability of employment of parents or care givers who
become disabled because of conflict, and psychological factors linked with being directly affected by
conflict are more likely explanations for this gap.
In columns (3) and (6) of Tables 10 and 11, we compare all IDPs with other migrants who live in
high conflict regions. This is another robustness check to avoid the possible argument that when we
compared IDPs living in conflict regions with other migrants in those regions, we might be dealing
with a select type of IDP. Because the previous scenario looks at IDPs who migrated to avoid conflict
yet still end up living in a high-conflict region, we may be looking at particularly vulnerable IDPs.
By comparing all IDPs, regardless of current residence, to migrants living in high-conflict regions,
we avoid this potential issue.
The results in columns (3) and (6) suggest that children of IDPs ages 6-11 have about 0.1
fewer years of schooling than other migrant children living in high-conflict municipalities but similar
probability of being enrolled in school. Children of IDPs ages 12-17 have 0.44 fewer years of schooling
and a 5.7% lower probability of being enrolled. We see that the education gap shrunk somewhat in
this model, suggesting that IDPs living in a high-conflict municipalities are to some extent different
from the average IDP.
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Table 11: Are IDPs different? Ages 12-17
Variable: Education Accumulation Model School Enrollment Model
All Migrants All obs All Migrants All
Migrants Conf > 0.3 with Conf > 0.3 Migrants Conf > 0.3 with Conf > 0.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IDP -0.341*** -0.395*** -0.443*** -0.041*** -0.088*** -0.057***
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Sex -0.427*** -0.429*** -0.506*** -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.050***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conflict -0.030 0.015 -0.131* -0.014 -0.020 -0.019
(0.10) (0.17) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Capacity -0.305** -0.404* -0.054 -0.032 -0.005 -0.016
(0.14) (0.21) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Urban 0.473*** 0.529*** 0.502*** 0.069*** 0.085*** 0.076***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.114*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad Yrs of sch. 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 24124 8116 48960 24155 8110 49048
F 168.88 71.87 -
P(F) 0.000 0.000 -
R2 0.492 0.481 0.476
χ2 1646.86 690.64 2658.44
P > (χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.207 0.190
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
In column (3) and (6) we are comparing all IDPs with both migrants and non-migrants leaving in a region
with high conflict. Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
6.6 Robustness checks: Are the results driven by sampling bias?
The analyses above suggest that being directly affected by conflict affects children’s probability of
being enrolled in school at both the elementary level and secondary level. It also affects their edu-
cation accumulation. However, the effect on younger children is smaller and not always significant.
On the other hand, the gaps for older children are consistently significant and of greater magnitude.
Although we find that some other migrant groups on average have lower levels of education, and
those living in high-conflict municipalities in general have slightly lower education accumulation and
enrollment, the gap does not compare to that faced by IDPs. Still, one might raise the question
of whether this persisting gap in education for IDPs is driven by some omitted variable that is
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Table 12: Who are we capturing?
Age Total With Both Parents Percentage
6-11 261,469 180,912 69.19%
12-17 250,349 158,347 63.25%
correlated with being directly affected by conflict. We are of the opinion that this is not the case
for several reasons.
First, although it is impossible to control for all possible factors that affect education outcomes,
we are able to control for most of the factors that have been shown in past empirical and theoretical
literature to be important for enrollment and accumulation. Our relatively high R-squared is one
indicator that our education accumulation model is relevant and explains a significant portion of
the variation in schooling and enrollment. Second, although there are other possible variables that
we do not control for, such as ability, we are not worried because their distribution should be similar
among IDPs and the comparison groups. In this scenario, the estimated education gap would not
be biased by their omission.
It is important to mention that our inclusion of some important variables that predict enrollment
and accumulation creates secondary effects. We control for parents’ education, and not every child
in the sample has this information available. Because we include the variable for parents’ education,
the analyses above are not conducted on the whole sample of children ages 6-17. Table 12 provides
a breakdown of the percentage of children included for each age cohort. We use 69% of the sample
ages 6-11 and 63% of the sample ages 12-17, raising the question of whether an analysis on the entire
sample would lead to a different outcome.
To investigate this possibility, we estimate the bias created in our estimate of the gap if we do
not include all the parent related variables. To find this bias, we first re-estimate our accumulation
and enrollment models with and without the parental variables, including both migrants and non-
migrants and restricting our sample to those who have parent information. The results from this
analysis are summarized in Tables 13 and 14. Notice that the results in columns (1) and (4) are
a repetition of earlier analysis and the results in column (2) and (5) are the estimated coefficients
if parental controls are not included for the same sample. The upward bias in the estimates is
significant if we do not include parental controls. Specifically for children 6-11, without parental
controls we overestimate the impact of direct contact with violence on school accumulation by 0.071
years and overestimate the probability of enrollment gap for those affected by violence by 1.3%.
For children 12-17, if we do not include parental controls, we overestimate the direct impact
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Table 13: Education Gap: Parental Controls v. No Parental Controls (Ages 6-11)
Education Accumulation Model Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parental No Parental Difference Parental No Parental Difference
control controls (2) - (1) controls controls (5) - (4)
IDP -0.197*** -0.268*** 0.071 -0.016* -0.029*** 0.013
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
N 171083 171083 171393 171393
F 1635.96 1677.78
P > (F ) 0.000 0.000
R2 0.663 0.648
χ2 5709.09 5571.68
P > χ2 0.000 0.000
PseudoR2 0.152 0.123
Note: Also controlled for sex, conflict, capacity, urban, mothers years of schooling and fathers years of
schooling, age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership, wall type,
computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children, state and
reasons for migration.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Base group: non-migrants.
of violence on school accumulation by 0.177 years and overestimate the enrollment gap by 2.2%.
Given our knowledge of the potential bias caused by not including parental controls, we re-estimate
equation (2) without parental controls on the whole sample. This means that the observations
that were not included previously because of missing information about parental controls are now
included in the analysis. The results are summarized in Table 15 columns (1), (3), (5) and (7).
Notice that for the children 6-11 years old, these estimates are very similar to the estimates we got
for the sample that have parental information when parental controls were dropped and the gap
estimated. For secondary school age children, the difference is slightly larger.
In columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), we present the corrected estimate of the education accumulation
and enrollment gaps using the estimated effect of not including parental controls highlighted in
Tables 13 and 14. These bias correct estimates will be valid as long the distribution when we use
the sample with parent control is no different from the distribution when we use the whole sample.
One way to check for the non-selectivity of the sample without parental controls is to test for
differences in means on a set of demographic and economic variables for the sample with parental
controls and the whole sample, restricting these samples to children ages 6-11 and 12-17. We find
that the means are almost identical for all variables except family size. For family size, the ages 6-11
sample with parental controls has a mean of 5.7, while the mean for the whole sample is 5.5. In the
33
Table 14: Education Gap: Parental Controls v. No Parental Controls (Ages 12-17)
Education Accumulation Model Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parental No Parental Difference Parental No Parental Difference
control controls (2) -(1) controls controls (5) - (4)
IDP -0.515*** -0.692*** 0.177 -0.063*** -0.085*** 0.022
(0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
N 148447 148447 148650 148650
F 777.69 734.11
P (F ) > 0 0 0
R2 0.4741 0.4366
χ2 7444.77 7696.18
P > χ2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1964 0.1752
Note: Also controlled for sex, conflict, capacity, urban, mothers years of schooling and fathers years of
schooling, age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership, wall type,
computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children, state and
reasons for migration.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Base group: non-migrants. The sample above is restricted to those who have parental controls only.
12-17 years range, the sample with parental controls has a mean of 5.9, while the sample without
parental controls has a mean of 5.3. The result of our means test suggests that the sample without
parental controls is very similar to the sample with parental controls, particularly for the 6-11 age
range.
6.7 Robustness checks: Fixed Effects
One possible argument against the validity of our above results is that we do not control for factors
within communities that could affect enrollment and attainment. If IDPs live in communities with
lower access to schools or lower social capacity and infrastructure, then the estimated gap compared
to nonmigrants could be capturing these the effects of these community-level differences and not the
direct effect of conflict. We address this potential issue by estimating our attainment model using
fixed effects. The choice of this technique eliminates potential bias caused by omitted variables at
the community (municipality) level. For example, pressure to leave school was one of the potential
omitted variables we try to deal with by looking solely at municipalities with high conflict. However,
it is possible to argue that not all high-conflict regions face similar pressure to drop out, so the
problem of this omitted variable still persists. Another possible argument is that although we control
for capacity and conflict using the HSRI indices, the use of these indexes which are a composite of
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Table 15: Estimated education gap between IDPs and non-migrants for samples with and without
parental controls
Age 6-11 Age 12-17
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Yrs of sch. Yrs of sch Enroll Enroll Yrs of sch. Yrs of sch Enroll Enroll
Corrected Corrected Corrected Enroll Corrected
Violence -0.264*** -0.193 -0.029*** -0.016 -0.669*** -0.492 -0.073*** -0.051
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
N 184128 184878 160686 161497
F 1759.36 787.88
P (F ) > 0 0.00 0.000
R2 0.64 0.424
χ2 8119.97 8735.37
P > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.172
Note: Also controlled for sex, conflict, capacity, urban, age, race, family size, disability, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, state and reasons for migration.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
several other variables might not still be an effective control for the differences in conflict, social and
economic capacity across municipalities. To show that our results are not driven by measurement
error or by omitted variables that vary at the municipality level, we introduced a fixed effect for
municipalities. Still, the use of municipality fixed effects does not deal with any omitted variable that
varies within the municipality. We have controlled for such variables in our analysis to the extent
possible. For other variables that might affect education outcomes, such as ability, we assume take
the same distribution across comparison groups, and so they would not introduce bias in estimating
the education gap.
Table 16 confirms our earlier results. In columns (1) and (2), we summarize the results comparing
IDPs to the base group of non-migrants. In columns (3) and (4), we compare IDPs solely to other
migrants. The results in Table 16 are our preferred estimates and suggest that children ages 6-11
who are directly exposed to conflict have 0.2 fewer years of schooling than non-migrants, and IDP
children ages 12-17 have 0.49 fewer years of schooling. Looking solely at migrants, we do not find
evidence of a statistically significant gap for younger children, but we do find evidence of a gap of
0.28 years among older children.
We are unable to use the fixed effect technique for the probit model. A not so perfect alternative
is to estimate a linear probability model. Although the linear probability specification of the binary
choice model provides ease of interpretation, unless restrictions are placed on estimates, coefficients
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Table 16: Does being directly affected by conflict create an education gap (Fixed Effects)?
IDP v. non-migrants IDP v. other migrants
6-11 12- 17 6-11 12- 17
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violence -0.199*** -0.487*** -0.035 -0.277***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Sex -0.163*** -0.588*** -0.133*** -0.509***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Urban 0.048*** 0.442*** 0.036** 0.385***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Mother Yrs sch. 0.054*** 0.134*** 0.048*** 0.121***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Father Yrs sch. 0.026*** 0.073*** 0.020*** 0.064***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 171083 148447 34457 24124
F 777.69 752.89
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile
ownership, wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s
number of children. In columns (1) and (2) we control for migration status, so dummies for other
types of migrants are estimated but not presented. The base group is non-migrants. In columns (3)
and (4) we have a binary indicator IDP = 1 and Other migrants = 0
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
can imply probabilities outside the unit interval. Table 17 shows the results of the estimation of
the enrollment model using fixed effects and assuming a linear probability model. These estimates
provide some evidence of an enrollment gap but the evidence is mixed. We are more cautious about
interpreting these estimates given the potential issue of the linear model itself.
One could also argue that birthplace municipality level factors matter more than current munic-
ipality. While we are not of this opinion, we provide a summary in Table 18 of fixed effect analyses
using municipality of birth. The results are very similar to those using current municipality.
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Table 17: Does being directly affected by conflict create an enrollment gap (Linear probability model
with Fixed Effects)?
IDP v. non-migrants IDP v. other migrants
6-11 12- 17 6-11 12- 17
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violence -0.009 -0.026*** -0.010* -0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
sex -0.013*** -0.058*** -0.012*** -0.050***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
urban 0.037*** 0.087*** 0.040*** 0.104***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Mother Yrs sch. 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.011***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Father Yrs sch. 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 171393 148650 34510 24158
F 284.82 530.42 63.28 97.43
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.099 0.172 0.916 0.169
Pseudo R2
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile
ownership, wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s
number of children.
In columns (1) and (2) we control for migration status, so dummies for other types of migrants are
estimated but not presented. The base group is non-migrants. In columns (3) and (4) we have a
binary indicator IDP = 1 and Other migrants = 0
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the idea that in low-intensity conflicts, not ever person living in a
supposedly high-conflict area is equally affected. While past research tends to look at the impact of
exposure to conflict alone on education, we investigate the question of how being directly affected
by conflict (i.e. being an IDP) affects education outcomes.
In this paper, we answer four questions related to the impact of conflict on education. Our first
question asks if there is an education gap for children living in municipalities with high conflict in
comparison to those living elsewhere. Second, we ask if there is an education gap for IDP children.
Third, we ask if living in a high-conflict municipality creates a similar education gap as being directly
37
Table 18: Does being directly affected by conflict create an enrollment gap-Estimates using Birth
Place Municipality Fixed Effects?
IDP versus non-migrants IDP versus other migrants
6-11 year old 12- 17 year old 6-11 year old 12- 17 year old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Attainment GAP)
Violence -0.212*** -0.446*** -0.045* -0.222***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
N 171083 148447 34457 24124
(Enrollment GAP)
Violence -0.009 -0.026*** -0.010* -0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 171393 148650 34510 24158
In column (1) and (2) we control for migration status so dummies for other types of migrants are
estimated but not presented. The base group is non-migrants. In column (3) and (4) we have a
binary indicator IDP = 1 and Other migrants = 0
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
affected by conflict. Finally, we ask how IDPs compare to other migrants with regard to education
outcomes.
Using OLS and probit analyses, we find that although there appears to be a gap in accumulation
and enrollment for children of those who live in high-conflict municipalities compared to those living
elsewhere, this gap does not appear to be robust. Next, we find evidence of education accumulation
and enrollment gaps for IDP children in comparison to non-migrants. We also find that living in
a high-conflict area does not create an identical effect as being directly affected by conflict. An
education gap persists and in fact grows when we compare IDPs to non-migrants living in high-
conflict regions. Similarly, the gap between IDPs and other migrants living in high-conflict areas
is larger than the gap between IDPs and all migrants, although the gap at the primary school
level is not always significant. Finally, our results suggest that in general, IDP children fare worse
than other migrant children with respect to education accumulation and enrollment. This result is
robust to dropping school migrants from the dataset. We test the robustness of our results using
fixed effects, and though the estimates differ slightly, the basic inference of a significant impact of
being directly affected by conflict persists, particularly at the secondary level.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, having a parent who was directly
affected by conflict negatively affects a child’s education accumulation and enrollment. This gap
grows as the child grows older. In contrast, mere exposure to conflict as captured by living in a
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high-conflict area does not seem to have as much impact on a child’s education outcomes. Given the
large literature that estimates the impact of conflict using exposure, our results suggest the need to
isolate those directly affected by conflict and collect more data on their specific experiences. This
kind of data would be useful in helping to create a framework for better understanding the channels
through which being directly affected by conflict affects education and other labor market outcomes.
Finally, while the above conclusions are most relevant for studies looking at low-intensity conflict,
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Appendix
Table 19: Are IDPs different? Ages 6-11
Variable: Education Accumulation Model School Enrollment Model
All Migrants All obs All Migrants All
Migrants Conf (> 0.3) with Conf (> 0.3 ) Migrants Conf (> 0.3) with Conf (> 0.3 )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IDP -0.095** -0.084 -0.105** -0.014* -0.024** -0.008
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sex -0.105*** -0.145*** -0.166*** -0.009*** -0.008* -0.010***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conflict -0.048 0.084 -0.023 -0.006 -0.001 -0.032***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capacity 0.144*** 0.252*** 0.286*** 0.002 0.002 0.022**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban -0.020 -0.016 0.009 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.023***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 59811 18975 57815 59809 19000 57893
F 712.62 252.27
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000
R2 0.692 0.6743 0.6469
χ2 1628.8 737.16 2541.03
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.136 0.173
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: Selection implies restricting the sample to subgroup which contains all IDPs and migrants leaving in
region with high conflict.
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Table 20: Are IDPs different? Ages 12-17
Variable: Education Accumulation Model School Enrollment Model
All Migrants All obs All Migrants All
Migrants Conf (> 0.3) with Conf (> 0.3 ) Migrants Conf (> 0.3) with Conf (> 0.3 )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IDP -0.412*** -0.440*** -0.443*** -0.051*** -0.101*** -0.057***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Sex -0.462*** -0.478*** -0.506*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.050***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conflict -0.066 0.056 -0.131* -0.016 0.004 -0.019
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Capacity -0.159 -0.002 -0.054 -0.023 -0.012 -0.016
(0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Urban 0.365*** 0.429*** 0.502*** 0.051*** 0.069*** 0.076***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Mom yrs of sch. 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dad yrs of sch. 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 48387 15512 48960 48438 15540 49048
F 287.77 114.54
P (F ) > 0 0.000 0.000
R2 0.482 0.478 0.476
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.190 0.192 0.190
Note: Also controlled for age, race, family size, disability, employment status of father, automobile ownership,
wall type, computer ownership, class of father’s work, class of mother’s work, mother’s number of children,
and department.
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 21: Humanitarian Situation Risk Index: Conflict Index
Variable Name Description
Subversive Actions Rate Hostile acts by subversive groups per 10,000 inhabitants, against
police or civilian infrastructure. Includes attacks on police installa-
tion, attacks on planes, urban attacks, armed contact, ambushes and
sieges.
Unilateral Attacks Total number of incursion with no combat
Total Confrontations Total confrontations between Public Forces and subversive groups
Total Deaths Total deaths in combat
Mine incident rate Number of mine incidents per 10,000 inhabitants
Homicide rate Homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Common homicides include all
deaths by weapon with the exception of traffic-related homicides
Council member homicide rate Homicide rate among council members, per 10,000 inhabitants
Union member homicide rate Homicide rate among union members, per 10,000 inhabitants
Teacher homicide rate Homicide rate among teachers, per 10,000 inhabitants
Indigenous homicide rate Homicide rate among indigenous people, per 10,000 inhabitants
Massacre victim rate Number of deaths in massacre per 10,000 inhabitants. A collective
homicide or massacre is committed when the total killed are four or
more persons. It must be committed at the same place, same time, by
the same authors, and against persons unable to defend themselves
Kidnap victim rate Kidnap victims per 10,000 inhabitants, including both simple and
extorsive kidnap victims. A kidnapping is the retention or hiding of
a person in order to exchange their freedom for some resource, avoid
some act, or for a publicity of political end.
FARC Groups Number of FARC groups present
ELN Groups Number of ELN groups present
Expulsion displacement rate Rate of forced displacement per 10,000, where the person is forcibly
expelled from the municipality
Reception displacement rate Rate of forced displacement per 10,000, where the person is forcibly
expelled to the municipality
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Table 22: Humanitarian Situation Risk Index: Response Capacity Index
Variable Name Description
Teachers with higher educa-
tion
Number of teachers with higher education
Student:teacher ratio Total number of students by number of teachers
Middle education institutional
presence
Number of middle education institutions per 10,000 inhabitants
SENA continuing education
center presence
Number of SENA institutions per 10,000 inhabitants
ICBF Family Welfare Institute
rate
Binary value, present or not present
Health center presence Number of health centers per 10,000 inhabitants
Vaccination coverage Percentage of population covered by vaccinations
Compensation services pres-
ence
Rate of compensation services present per 10,000 inhabitants
Judicial dispatch presence Rate of presence of judicial dispatches per 10,000 inhabitants
Conciliation center presence Rate of presence of conciliation centers per 10,000 inhabitants
Police station presence Binary value, present or not present
Rural citizen soldier presence Binary value, present or not present
Presence of major highway Binary value, present or not present
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